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Kantian theories of territorial rights currently on offer are attractive for a number of reasons. One                               
advantage over other types of theories is that rights to territory are based on rights relations between                                 
persons and not on some mysterious relationship to land as such. They also stress the political ties of                                   
peoples rather than appealing to problematic notions such as national identity. Kant’s legal and political                             
theory provides a fruitful theoretical framework which allows for many different nuances in accounting                           
for territorial rights, as illustrated by Anna Stilz’s functionalist theory and Lea Ypi’s permissive theory. In                               
this paper, I argue that although these theories address some plausible intuitions about when limitations                             
on the territorial claims of states should obtain, more work needs to be done in order to provide a more                                       
systematic account of these limitations. 
Anna Stilz provides a functionalist theory of territorial rights which bases rights to territory on the shared                                 
political history of individuals under a common state and on that state’s legitimacy. Central to her                               
account is the distinction between occupancy rights and territorial rights proper. Occupancy rights are                           
an aggregated bundle of individual rights to remain in a certain place. Territorial rights, in contrast, are                                 
the prerogative of states only. A state has a right to exercise jurisdiction over that territory if it represents                                     
the individuals who have occupancy rights, who then become a people. Despite the dependence of                             
states’ jurisdictional rights on prior individual occupancy rights, Stilz is in fact proposing a strong statist                               
view of territorial rights: there are no territorial rights without the state.  
A necessary condition for territorial rights is that states be able to effectively exercise justice within its                                 
territory. Territorial occupancy is essential to personal autonomy: the pursuit of individuals’ goals,                         
relationships and life projects. States in turn are needed because they can bring about the background                               
framework enabling the exercise of personal autonomy: they can secure options and opportunities and                           
provide the stability required for pursuing life plans (Stilz, p. 584). But a stable legal residence, Stilz                                 
claims, is also essential to personal autonomy (p. 584). Persons have a fundamental interest in remaining                               
in the territory within which their lives and goals are organized. Whoever is born in a territory through                                   
“no fault of her own” and has continually lived there (showing that residence in that territory is essential                                   
to her life plans) should be granted occupancy rights. A question which naturally arises is what “no fault                                   
of one’s own” precisely means, and consequently what would be wrongful occupation. I will return to                               
this issue later on in the paper.  
The theory adopts a different concept of a people or nation to nationalist theories. Peoples are identified                                 
primarily by their common political ties and statehood history rather than by shared culture. A history of                                 
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shared statehood gives rise to a relationship, which the individuals involved have a reason to value. This                                 
value provides them with a reason to uphold their legitimate state.  
Their interest in maintaining this shared history gives them a claim to political autonomy, enabling them to                                 
continue to pursue their joint project without interference from outsiders (p.596). In contrast, common                           
life under an illegitimate state does not create a people. Unless the population has been actively engaged                                 
in activities that promotes organization knowledge and can bring about future political capacity, such as                             
liberation movements against the repressive government, it does not qualify for a people. It is evident                               
that not all states will be able to satisfy the minimal conditions of legitimacy required for territorial rights                                   
in Stilz’s account. 
It is not clear how the argument about the value of shared statehood is supposed to relate to the view                                       
that there is a duty to create and uphold a legitimate state. Is the fact that shared statehood gives rise to                                         
a valuable relationship between citizens an additional reason to uphold the state? Or is the valuable                               
relationship argument necessary only to protect the group’s autonomy during times of political instability,                           
where appeal to the legitimacy of the state is no longer possible? It is important to note that Kant’s                                     
original thesis is not that one has a duty to uphold only legitimate states, but that one has a duty to enter                                           1
rightful relations with others, in other words, to leave the state of nature. Even a less efficient form                                   2
of political association than Stilz’s minimally legitimate state would satisfy Kant’s requirement (even                         
though one should work towards approaching an ideal just constitution). Stilz is actually reinterpreting                           3
the Kantian duty to leave the state of nature in a more demanding way by taking it firstly to be a duty to                                             
form a state and secondly as imposing an obligation to uphold only legitimate states. This is the reason                                   
why she needs to introduce additional considerations to the duty argument, namely, to counteract the                             4
obvious implication of the theory which is that as soon as a legitimate state vanishes, so do the claims of                                       
the population to their territory and to political autonomy. 
Stilz argues that respect for human rights ensures the laws of states are not simply imposed on their                                   
subjects, but that subjects could also endorse these laws (p. 589). Human rights are thus among the                                 
minimal standards for a state’s legitimacy. She concludes that countries such as China and Venezuela                             
lack territorial rights, since they fail to uphold these minimal standards. Although “quasi­democratic”                         
1 Kant’s writings are cited according to the volume: page number of the Prussian Academy Edition of Kant’s                                   







4 See Byrd and Hruschka, Kant’s Doctrine of Right: a Commentary, CUP 2010, chap. I, for an account why leaving                                       
the state of nature does not commit one to enter specifically a state, but a juridical condition (rechtlicher Zustand,                                     
status iuridicus), that is, a condition under which the rule of law applies and individuals can enjoy their rights (MS                                       




Venezuela would have a better standing than China (since fundamental rights are at least embedded in                               
the Venezuelan constitution) it also fails to exercise justice (p. 588). Stilz is careful to stress that the lack                                     
of territorial rights does not entail an authorization for foreign states to displace or annex these                               
populations. The reason is that displacement and annexation are unilateral acts which no other state has                               
the authority to impose on another, regardless of the occupants’ lack of territorial rights. But if                               
annexation and displacement are unilateral acts, so is the occupation of a certain territory to the                               
exclusion of others. Why is unilaterality a problem in one case, but not in the other? This is something                                     
that Stilz unfortunately does not explain.  
Non­state peoples are nevertheless disadvantaged by Stilz’s account. Peoples “are brought into being                         
by states; they need not pre­exist them” (p. 580). Unless there is a collective agent capable of sustaining                                   
legitimate political authority, groups with no centralized political authority such as tribal and clan groups                             
may have rights of occupancy but no jurisdictional rights over their territory. The fact that non­state                               
peoples cannot have territorial rights makes them particularly vulnerable: nothing could speak against                         
their annexation by a well meaning legitimate state, which would grant them occupancy but retain the                               
privilege of exercising jurisdiction over the territory. Stilz’s account privileges liberal states as the only                             
forms of political organization capable of satisfying the minimal conditions for legitimacy and for                           
territorial rights. This seems counter­intuitive insofar as one may consider a native people’s relation to a                               
particular territory much more significant to them in terms of personal autonomy and way of life than for                                   
liberal societies. The only alternative open to groups which do not identify themselves with the legitimate                               
state under which they are subjected would be to organize themselves politically against the government.                             
However, the group would be violating an obligation to uphold a just state, which is already in place.                                   
The possibility of starting a new form of political organization is closed off in that case. Kant, in contrast,                                     
recognized the territorial rights of non­state peoples and granted them a right not to be occupied even                                 
under the pretext of bringing political organization to the “wild savages.” This is because he did not see                                   5
the existence of a legitimate state as a necessary condition for territorial rights.  
Since the people’s special relation to the land is irrelevant for territorial rights, a related worry is the                                   
account’s difficulty in explaining why legitimate states can claim a particular territory as opposed to any                               
other area of the globe. Although accounting for the so called “particularity problem” is a well known                                 
strength of nationalist theories, Stilz rejects nationalist approaches by criticizing the Lockean labor                         
theory on which these approaches rely. For instance, states are not able to claim jurisdiction over                               
underdeveloped areas using a Lockean framework. Nationalist theories tacitly rely “on a prior account                           
of administrative boundaries – labor within which grounds a right to the entire territory – rather than                                 
explaining the genesis of these boundaries” (p. 577). But it is unclear how Stilz’s theory can do a better                                     
job of justifying the genesis of boundaries. The legitimacy of states is independent of how boundaries                               
came about; it has to do with the way the state exercises its function. Nevertheless, Stilz wants the                                   




of states. But what determines what is just or unjust when it comes to the genesis of boundaries? The                                     
fact that persons came to occupy a certain geographical area through “no fault of their own”? But what                                   
if other people arrived there first, equally through no fault of their own? What is it about this “innocent”                                     
occupation of space that can give rise to occupancy rights, as opposed to other forms of unilateral                                 




Lea Ypi appeals to aspects of Kant’s legal theory which have not been explored before in                               
contemporary approaches to territorial rights and which have been so far mainly confined to Kantian                             
scholarship: the notion of permissive laws (leges permissivae, Erlaubnisgesetze). A permissive law is                         
an authorization to do an action which would otherwise be prohibited, because it is strictly required for                                 
the promotion of a morally required end or state of affairs. As the title of the theory suggests, there is a                                         
permission to control territory to the exclusion of others. 
Kant tells us a story about why acquisition of land and external objects is necessary for the exercise of                                     
external freedom. He also explains why the concept of having an external object of choice entails not                                 6
only the possibility of disposing of that thing independently of a constant physical connection to the                               
object, but also exclusive possession. The need to bring the use of external objects under legal                               7
concepts leads us to postulate persons’ ability to become legal owners of objects and consequently to                               
a permission to acquire to the exclusion of others.  
Because acquisition of land and objects must start before a cosmopolitan condition of public justice has                               
been achieved, the right to control external objects and land is provisional. However, the permission to                               
acquire to the exclusion of others also imposes obligations: we have a duty to enter a condition of                                   
public justice with all others, for it is only under a civil condition that unilateral acts of acquisition can be                                       
regarded as compatible with the united will of all. As Ypi rightly recognizes, the obligation to enter                                 
rightful relations with others is not restricted to the inner state level, but is universal in scope; it must be                                       
extended to international and finally to cosmopolitan level. On this point, Ypi’s theory can be                             
considered “more radical” than Stilz’s, which focuses on states’ internal organisation. 
Ypi interprets provisionality as postponing a full justification of territorial rights. As she puts it, why a                                 
group is entitled to a specific territory in the world is an answer that “cannot be conclusively provided;                                   
not until a political authority realizing the universal principle of right is founded” (p.16). Further, she                               
6 This is for Kant a complicated story because external objects are not included in one’s innate right (that applies                                       
only to one’s own person and actions) and therefore require an “extension” of freedom. For an account of how Kant                                       





claims that provisional theory is “ecumenical” because it can accommodate different accounts of how                           
groups have come to occupy specific areas of the globe. After all, Ypi concludes, regardless of the way                                   
groups have come to control a certain territory, “the kind of claims they can be collectively authorized to                                   
make over specific areas of geographic space are provisional and conditional at best” (p. 16). Kant’s                               
theory of acquisition is, and must be, blind to the empirical conditions of occupation, since empirical                               
facts per se are unable to play any justificatory role in his theoretical framework. In other words, there is                                     
nothing intrinsic about the form of occupation that can justify territorial rights. The form of occupation                               
can only provide a “sign” of the extent of one’s occupation. However, how can the claim that territorial                                   
rights are “conditional and provisional at best” help us determine when occupation is rightful?  
Ypi often suggests that provisionality implies weaker, or at least more “flexible”, rights compared to                             
rights which have a conclusive status. For instance, she claims that because the right to territory is                                 
provisional, persons with peaceful intent have a right to visit one’s territory (p. 19) , tacitly suggesting                               8
that in a world in which territorial rights would be peremptory, there would be no rights to visit. There is                                       
evidence in Kant’s text that provisionality actually grants host peoples the right to reject peaceful                             
visitors at will (if refusing entry does not entail the visitors’ destruction) , and not the rights of the visitors                                     9
themselves to be admitted in a foreign territory. Kant’s argument for a right to safe haven appeals to the                                     
notion of common possession of the earth and not to the fact that the rights of the host people are “only”                                         
provisional. Although Ypi mentions the notion of common possession of the earth, she does not                             10
explain in depth the relationship between that notion, provisional rights to territory and the right to visit. 
As Kant stresses, respecting provisional acquisition as true acquisition is a necessary condition for the                             
development towards global public justice. “Provisonal” should be understood as “preliminary legal                       
possession” as opposed to conclusively secured possession (possession which is unequivocally                     
determined and secured by an omnilateral global political institution) . Provisionality is thus a                         11
future­oriented form of justification (“in expectation and preparation for a global civil condition”) .                         12
However, this does not allow us to regard provisional rights as being somehow “flexible” due to their                                 
inconclusive status: since all rights are provisional from a global perspective, it would be possible to                               
impose all sorts of arbitrary limitations on provisional rights before a cosmopolitan civil condition obtains                             
(in case it would ever obtain in such a chaotic scenario). Although one may have intuitions concerning                                 
when and how territorial rights should be limited, one still needs to justify these limitations. If we are to                                     










Ypi’s emphasis on “permissive principles” also clouds the real justification of territorial rights, which is                             
freedom in a Kantian account. Permissive principles are authorizations, and as such cannot function as                             
self­standing principles within a theory of rights. Permissions are dependent on more fundamental                         
principles, namely prohibitions or commissions to do certain acts, which they limit under certain                           
circumstances. Permissive principles can neither “prescribe” (p. 19) nor be employed “to assess                         
normatively relevant circumstances in which a course of action incompatible with the idea of equal                             
freedom is pursued” (p.3). If a permission applies, this is because practical reason already recognizes                             
the need to sanction a certain state of affairs as a necessary starting point for realizing right. Permissive                                   
principles as such have no normative or regulative role. Permissive laws are nevertheless required                           
because they mediate between the historical and often violent beginnings of political associations and its                             
rational justification. Civil society must start somewhere. However, this start is inevitably coercive,                         
simply because there is no other way for the implementation of right to start other than with unilateral                                   
acts which hinder the freedom of others in a way that is incompatible with the principle of right.                                   




Among the theories of territorial rights currently on offer, Kantian theories are the ones which link the                                 
right to control a territory to the exercise of human freedom. Because individual freedom must be not                                 
only secured but also made compatible with the freedom of all others, the subjection to political                               
institutions is considered a duty. Although the Kantian theories of territorial rights I analyzed in this                               
paper broadly agree with this general picture, they diverge in their accounts of how the exercise of                                 
freedom justifies territorial rights and on the scope of the obligation arising from the right to exclude                                 
others from a territory. However, I argued that a common shortcoming of these theories is accounting                               
for limitations on territorial rights: while Ypi’s permissive theory allows too much arbitrariness in regard                             
to provisional acquisition, Stilz’s account lacks a more unified approach to occupancy rights.  
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